

THE ATLANTIC ESTABLISHMENT

McCloy · Dulles · Monnet · Murnane · Reichswerke Hermann Göring ·
ECSC

*From the Black Tom Explosion (1916) to the European Coal & Steel Community
(1951)*

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I. THE PRE-WAR FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (1895–1933)

1.1 The Ruhr Industrial Complex and Anglo-American Finance

The industrial heartland of continental Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the Ruhr valley and surrounding regions of western Germany. The great industrial dynasties — Krupp, Thyssen, Flick, Mannesmann, Haniel — controlled integrated operations in coal mining, coking, iron and steel production, and heavy engineering. These enterprises were deeply embedded in the transatlantic financial system from the outset. American and British banks financed German industrial expansion throughout the Wilhelmine period. J. Henry Schröder & Co. of London was the primary underwriting house for Ruhr industrial bonds. Kuhn, Loeb & Co. of New York — in which the Warburg family were partners — placed German sovereign and industrial paper in US capital markets. The House of Morgan held German corporate clients throughout the pre-war decades.

The Warburg family embodied this transatlantic structure with particular clarity. Paul Warburg was a partner at Kuhn, Loeb in New York and the principal architect of the US Federal Reserve System (1913). His brother Max Warburg ran M.M. Warburg & Co. in Hamburg and served as a financial adviser to the German government at Versailles. Felix Warburg was a leading figure in New York philanthropy. The family communicated fluidly across national boundaries throughout the pre-war and wartime periods.

1.2 Sullivan & Cromwell and the German Corporate Bond Circuit

Sullivan & Cromwell (S&C) was, by the early twentieth century, the preeminent American law firm for German corporate and sovereign finance. John Foster Dulles joined the firm in 1911 and became its dominant voice on German matters, ultimately serving as senior partner from 1926. S&C's German client portfolio included Krupp AG, I.G. Farben, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Thyssen interests, and multiple tranches of German government bonds placed in the American market. S&C maintained its Berlin office until 1935, long after most American firms had closed their German operations following Hitler's accession to power in January 1933. The Berlin office closed only after the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 rendered its operation untenable.

1.3 The Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, and the BIS

The reparations crisis of the early 1920s — in which Germany's inability to meet Versailles obligations led to the French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 — was resolved through American financial intervention structured largely by Sullivan & Cromwell.

Dawes Plan (1924)	Restructured German reparations and opened the door to large-scale American private lending to Germany. Between 1924 and 1931, approximately \$2.5 billion in American private capital flowed to Germany, rebuilding the industrial infrastructure that the Nazi regime would subsequently inherit.
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Young Plan (1929)	A further restructuring of reparations, again with S&C involvement, which created the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as the mechanism for managing reparations transfers.
BIS (est. 1930)	Headquartered in Basel, Switzerland. Key figures: Hjalmar Schacht (Reichsbank), Montagu Norman (Bank of England), Thomas McKittrick (US, BIS President throughout the war). The BIS continued operations throughout the Second World War, receiving and processing Nazi gold including looted assets. Calls for its closure at Bretton Woods (1944) were resisted.
Standard Oil / I.G. Farben	The Jasco Agreement (1929) between Standard Oil of New Jersey and I.G. Farben provided for global sharing of synthetic fuel and rubber patents. This agreement continued to have operational effect during the Second World War, enabling the Nazi synthetic fuel programme. Standard Oil was central to the Rockefeller interests that McCloy would later represent as Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank.

II. THE BLACK TOM EXPLOSION AND THE INVESTIGATION (1916–1939)

2.1 The Explosion: 30 July 1916

On the night of 30 July 1916, a catastrophic explosion destroyed the Black Tom Island munitions depot at Jersey City, New Jersey. Approximately two million pounds of war materiel awaiting shipment to Allied forces in Europe — artillery shells, TNT, and related explosives — was detonated in a series of blasts beginning at approximately 2:08 a.m. The explosions were heard as far as Philadelphia and Maryland. Windows shattered across lower Manhattan. Shrapnel damaged the Statue of Liberty, pitting the torch arm and penetrating the skirt. Several persons died, including an infant in Jersey City. Property damage was estimated at \$20–22 million in 1916 dollars.

John Jay McCloy was at that time a law student, present at a resort in nearby New Jersey. He witnessed the explosion and the illuminated night sky. Within a decade it would become the central case of his professional life.

A follow-up act of sabotage occurred on 11 January 1917, when the Kingsland ammunition factory in Lyndhurst, New Jersey — producing shells for the Russian Army — was set ablaze by an incendiary device, destroying approximately \$17 million worth of shells. Both incidents were attributed to the same German network.

2.2 The German Sabotage Network

The Black Tom explosion was the work of German Imperial intelligence, which had conducted a systematic campaign of sabotage against American munitions production and shipment since 1914. The United States was technically neutral, but American industry was supplying the Allies with substantial quantities of war materiel. The principal actors were:

Hauptmann Franz von Rintelen

German Naval Intelligence officer, active in the United States April–August 1915

Von Rintelen operated under a false Swiss passport and directed the broader sabotage campaign, organising agents, dock workers, and sympathisers. He was arrested by British intelligence in August 1915 while attempting to return to Germany disguised as a British officer.

Friedrich Hinsch

German shipping captain; operational director of the sabotage network

Hinsch coordinated the placement of incendiary devices on vessels and in warehouses after von Rintelen's arrest, becoming one of the primary operational figures for the remainder of the campaign.

Kurt Jahnke

German Army intelligence operative (Abteilung IIIb)

One of the direct operatives at Black Tom. Jahnke was a skilled intelligence agent who operated in the United States, Mexico, and later East Asia. He remained active in German intelligence into the Nazi period, eventually working within the SS intelligence apparatus (Sicherheitsdienst).

Lothar Witzke

German intelligence operative

Worked alongside Jahnke in the US sabotage campaign. Arrested by US authorities in 1918, sentenced to death (later commuted to life imprisonment), and released in 1923 under German diplomatic pressure.

Franz von Papen

German Military Attaché, Washington DC, 1914–1915

Von Papen was the German Military Attaché in Washington who was aware of and in some cases directing sabotage operations from the German Embassy. He was expelled from the United States by American authorities in December 1915 following evidence of his involvement. He later played a pivotal role in engineering Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933 and served as Vice-Chancellor in Hitler's first cabinet. His subsequent career — Ambassador to Austria 1934–38, Ambassador to Turkey 1939–44 — kept him at the centre of Nazi foreign policy.

Karl Boy-Ed

German Naval Attaché, Washington DC, 1914–1915

Naval counterpart to von Papen, also aware of the US sabotage campaign and expelled alongside von Papen in December 1915.

2.3 McCloy Enters the Case: Cravath Law Firm

John Jay McCloy (31 March 1895 – 11 March 1989) graduated from Harvard Law School in 1921 and joined Cravath, Henderson & de Gersdorff as an associate. Cravath had a substantial practice in German war-damage and reparations litigation. McCloy was assigned to the Black Tom and Kingsland cases almost immediately. He became a partner in 1929. The cases became the defining work of his partnership years.

2.4 The Mixed Claims Commission and the Investigation

The US-German Mixed Claims Commission, established under a bilateral agreement in 1922, was empowered to hear claims arising from German sabotage and unrestricted submarine warfare. The fundamental legal challenge was establishing not merely that individual German agents had committed the acts, but that the German Imperial government itself had authorised and directed the sabotage. Only state responsibility would trigger liability under international law. Germany strenuously denied this.

Over fifteen years, McCloy and his investigators obtained and translated thousands of documents from German military and diplomatic archives; located and interviewed former German agents, some under oath; traced financial flows from the German embassy accounts to the sabotage network; identified the chain of command from field operatives through military attachés to the General Staff in Berlin; and documented von Papen's role in authorising operations. This required repeated extended visits to Germany throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

2.5 McCloy's Contacts Within the Hitler Regime (1933–1939)

When Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, the investigation was already nine years old and continued throughout the Nazi period. In pursuing the case, McCloy maintained contact with a range of figures in the Hitler regime. Some contacts were necessary to the legal proceedings; others arose from the professional circumstances of conducting legal work in Nazi Germany.

Franz von Papen

Vice-Chancellor 1933–34; Ambassador to Austria 1934–38; Ambassador to Turkey 1939–44

Von Papen's role as Military Attaché in authorising the Black Tom sabotage made him the central figure whose testimony and documentation were sought throughout the investigation. His identification in the Black Tom files as a director of the US sabotage campaign was an extraordinary intelligence asset once he became Vice-Chancellor under Hitler and subsequently one of the regime's senior diplomats. McCloy's investigative files constituted a detailed dossier on von Papen's wartime activities. Von Papen was acquitted at Nuremberg but convicted by a West German de-Nazification court.

Hjalmar Schacht

Reichsbank President 1933–39; Reich Economics Minister 1934–37

Schacht was the central figure in Nazi economic policy in the 1930s and the counterpart for all matters involving German sovereign debt — including the reparations obligations at the heart of the Black Tom case. Dulles (S&C) met regularly with Schacht on German debt restructuring. McCloy, through Cravath's parallel reparations work, was also in contact with Schacht's office and associates. Schacht maintained deliberate ties to Western bankers throughout the 1930s, ties that contributed to his acquittal at Nuremberg.

Kurt Jahnke

SS intelligence apparatus (Sicherheitsdienst) from the mid-1930s

Jahnke, one of the principal Black Tom suspects, transitioned from Wilhelmine military intelligence into the Nazi SS intelligence structure. McCloy's investigators maintained surveillance of Jahnke throughout the 1930s. His continued presence in German state intelligence was itself evidence supporting the core legal argument that the Black Tom sabotage had been conducted with state sanction.

Rudolf Nadolny

German diplomat; Ambassador to the Soviet Union 1933–34; senior Foreign Ministry figure

Nadolny had knowledge of pre-war German diplomatic and military operations relevant to the investigation and was in contact with McCloy's team. His cooperation — partial and carefully managed from the German side — was part of the complex negotiation over documentary evidence.

Otto Meissner

State Secretary, Presidential Chancellery under Hindenburg and Hitler; Chief of the Presidential Chancellery under Hitler

Meissner had detailed knowledge of the decision-making processes of the German Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi presidencies. He was consulted by McCloy's team on questions of institutional responsibility and chain of command within the pre-war German state.

German Foreign Ministry Officials (Auswärtiges Amt)

Various senior officials throughout the 1930s

The investigation required extensive engagement with the Foreign Ministry over documentary access. The Auswärtiges Amt held custody of pre-war Washington Embassy files. Negotiations over these files brought McCloy into regular contact with senior Foreign Ministry officials. The Foreign Ministry's cooperation was managed as a diplomatic and legal matter at the highest levels of the German state.

Former WWI Intelligence Officers and Military Veterans

Various; many integrated into Nazi state security apparatus by the 1930s

By the 1930s, surviving participants in the WWI US sabotage campaign had re-entered German public life — in military roles, intelligence structures, and industry. McCloy's investigators tracked these individuals for testimony and documentation, building a detailed map of the surviving Wilhelmine intelligence network, many members of which were integrated into the Nazi security state.

2.6 Settlement and Legacy of the Investigation

In November 1939, the Mixed Claims Commission umpire handed down a decision accepting American liability claims for Black Tom and Kingsland, finding the German Imperial government responsible. Germany's Nazi government was the successor state for purposes of liability. Actual payment — over \$50 million — was ultimately made by the post-war Federal Republic in the 1950s, during the period when McCloy was serving as US High Commissioner in Germany.

The investigation gave McCloy a direct working knowledge of German institutional culture, intelligence methods, legal frameworks, and key personalities across two successive German regimes. He had conducted a systematic study of how German state power was organised and exercised, engaging with the actual personnel of that state. No other American possessed equivalent knowledge of Germany from the inside when President Truman appointed him High

Commissioner in 1949.

III. JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND SULLIVAN & CROMWELL (1911–1953)

3.1 S&C and German Industrial Clients

John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) joined Sullivan & Cromwell in 1911, became a partner in 1919, and served as senior partner from 1926 until his appointment as Secretary of State in 1953. He was born into a family of American diplomatic tradition: his grandfather John W. Foster served as Secretary of State under President Harrison; his uncle Robert Lansing served as Secretary of State under Wilson. He attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as an American economic adviser, opposing the level of reparations demanded of Germany and predicting — correctly — that they would destabilise the Weimar Republic.

S&C's German practice comprised: Krupp AG (bond issuances in the American market throughout the 1920s); I.G. Farben (American interests and financing, including involvement adjacent to the Farben-Standard Oil Jasco Agreement); Vereinigte Stahlwerke (the great steel trust formed in 1926); German sovereign bonds; and the legal structuring of the Dawes and Young Plan financing mechanisms. S&C's Berlin office remained open until 1935.

3.2 Dulles, Schacht and Nazi Economic Policy

Following Hitler's accession, Dulles maintained his German client relationships longer than almost any other senior American lawyer. His most significant Nazi-era contact was Hjalmar Schacht, who served as Reichsbank President from March 1933 and as Reich Economics Minister from August 1934 to November 1937. Schacht was the architect of Germany's economic recovery in the early Nazi period, and deliberately maintained contacts with Western bankers and financiers partly to preserve Germany's access to international credit. Dulles was among those Western figures with whom Schacht met regularly, addressing German debt restructuring and the treatment of American creditors. Schacht was acquitted at Nuremberg — the only senior Nazi official so acquitted on all charges.

3.3 Allen Dulles and the Intelligence Dimension

John Foster Dulles's younger brother Allen Welsh Dulles (1893–1969) served as OSS station chief in Bern, Switzerland from November 1942. From this position he ran one of the most productive Allied intelligence operations of the war. His most controversial wartime operation was Operation Sunrise (1945), in which he negotiated a separate German surrender in Italy directly with SS General Karl Wolff, without Soviet knowledge and in technical violation of Allied unconditional surrender policy. After the war, Allen Dulles played a central role in establishing the CIA. His wartime German contacts became the foundation of CIA operations in Europe, most notably through the incorporation of the Gehlen Organisation — General Reinhard Gehlen's wartime Eastern Front intelligence network — into Western intelligence structures. Allen became CIA Director in 1953, serving simultaneously with his brother's tenure as Secretary of State.

IV. JEAN MONNET: THE MAN AND HIS NETWORKS (1888–1955)

4.1 Early Career and WWI Supply Coordination

Jean Omer Marie Gabriel Monnet (9 November 1888 – 16 March 1979) was born in Cognac, France, the son of a cognac merchant. He left school at sixteen without a baccalaureate and never attended university. He learned international commerce in the family business, travelling to London, Canada, and the United States as a salesman in his youth. This gave him fluency in English and an ease with Anglo-American business culture unusual among French officials of his generation.

When war broke out in 1914, Monnet was deemed unfit for military service on health grounds. He proposed to the French government that it establish a joint Franco-British mechanism for coordinating war supplies — at the time a radical concept, as France and Britain were conducting separate procurement operations. The proposal was accepted. Monnet spent the war years in London as the French representative on the Anglo-French Supply Commission, operating at the most senior levels of Allied economic management, in regular contact with cabinet ministers and senior civil servants on both sides of the Channel.

4.2 The League of Nations and Private Finance

From 1919 to 1923, Monnet served as Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations — effectively the League's chief administrator — under Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond. In this role he supervised the League's early institutional organisation and participated in the resolution of post-war territorial and financial disputes, including the resolution of the Upper Silesian question (1921) and the financial reconstruction of Austria (1922). He resigned in 1923 and moved into private finance.

From 1923 to 1925, Monnet worked at Blair & Co., a New York investment bank that specialised in European sovereign debt restructuring. At Blair he began building his first substantial network of American financial contacts, including relationships that would later connect him to the Brown Brothers Harriman circle. He then undertook advisory work on behalf of the Bank of China and the Chinese government (1933–35) before forming his own partnership.

4.3 Monnet, Murnane & Co. — The Wall Street Partnership

In 1934, Monnet formed Monnet, Murnane & Co. in partnership with George Murnane. The firm maintained offices in New York, Paris, and Shanghai. Its principal activities were European industrial restructuring, Depression-era corporate debt management, Chinese railroad finance, and advisory work for governments and major corporations navigating the economic turbulence of the 1930s. The partnership operated until approximately 1938, when geopolitical deterioration effectively ended its European practice.

4.4 George Murnane and Brown Brothers Harriman

George Murnane was a Goldman Sachs alumnus who had become a senior partner at Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. — the private banking house formed through the 1931 merger of Brown Brothers & Co. with W.A. Harriman & Co. Brown Brothers Harriman was one of the most influential private banks in American history. Its partners in the 1930s included:

- **W. Averell Harriman** — senior partner; later US Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1943–46), Secretary of Commerce (1946–48), Marshall Plan administrator in Europe (ECA, 1948–50), Governor of New York (1955–58). Harriman was among the principal architects of the post-war Western order and a central figure in Monnet's American network.
- **Robert A. Lovett** — partner; later Assistant Secretary of War for Air (1941–45), Under Secretary of State (1947–49), Deputy Secretary of Defense (1950–51), Secretary of Defense (1951–53). One of the primary architects of NATO.
- **Prescott Bush** — partner; later US Senator from Connecticut (1952–63), father of President George H.W. Bush.
- **Knight Woolley** — partner; significant figure in post-war American financial diplomacy.

Murnane's position at Brown Brothers Harriman meant that the Monnet-Murnane partnership was effectively an extension of one of the most politically connected banking houses in the United States. Through Murnane, Monnet entered the social and professional world of the American eastern establishment at its highest level.

4.5 Monnet's US Establishment Contacts: The Full Network

The following individuals constituted Monnet's core network within the American foreign policy and financial establishment, built through the Murnane partnership, wartime supply coordination, and his post-war reconstruction work:

W. Averell Harriman

Brown Brothers Harriman; US Special Envoy; ECA Administrator (Marshall Plan); Secretary of Commerce

Monnet's single most important American contact. Harriman and Monnet had worked together on wartime supply matters and maintained a close relationship throughout the 1940s. As administrator of the European Cooperation Administration (ECA) — the body executing the Marshall Plan in Europe from 1948 — Harriman was the American official most directly positioned to shape European economic integration. He used this position to press European governments toward integration as a condition of Marshall Plan assistance. Monnet's ECSC design was the institutional answer to that pressure. The two men corresponded regularly and coordinated strategy during the Schuman Plan negotiations.

Dean Acheson

Assistant Secretary of State 1941–45; Under Secretary of State 1945–47; Secretary of State 1949–53

Acheson was among the most senior American officials to whom Monnet had direct personal access. Monnet briefed Acheson in person on the Schuman Plan on 7 May 1950 — two days before the public announcement and before the French Cabinet had been formally informed. Acheson's endorsement was, as he later described it, 'immediate and enthusiastic.' This sequence — a French official informing the American Secretary of State before his own government — was made possible only by the depth of personal trust between the two men.

John J. McCloy

Asst. Secretary of War 1941–45; World Bank President 1947–49; US High Commissioner Germany 1949–52; Chase Manhattan Chairman 1953–60

McCloy and Monnet moved in the same American establishment circles throughout the 1940s, connected through Harriman and Acheson. As High Commissioner in Germany, McCloy was the critical American official for ECSC implementation: he managed the German side of the equation, working with Chancellor Adenauer to ensure West German participation, and oversaw the end of Allied occupation controls on the Ruhr that had made the Schuman Plan legally possible. McCloy and Monnet coordinated directly during the 1950–51 Treaty of Paris negotiations.

Robert A. Lovett

Asst. Secretary of War for Air 1941–45; Under Secretary of State 1947–49; Dep. Secretary of Defense 1950–51; Secretary of Defense 1951–53

A Brown Brothers Harriman partner and the closest professional associate of Harriman. Lovett was one of the principal architects of NATO and a central figure in post-war American foreign policy. His connection to Monnet was primarily through the Harriman network and shared work on European security architecture.

Will Clayton

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 1946–47

Clayton was the primary State Department official who, in 1947, drafted the internal memoranda that became the conceptual foundation for the Marshall Plan. He was a direct contact of Monnet's and shared Monnet's view that European economic integration was necessary for lasting stability. Clayton's advocacy within the State Department for what became the Marshall Plan was directly connected to the integration agenda that Monnet was pursuing.

George C. Marshall

Secretary of State 1947–49; Secretary of Defense 1950–51

While Monnet did not have the same personal relationship with Marshall that he had with Harriman or Acheson, Marshall's Harvard commencement address of 5 June 1947 — which launched the Marshall Plan — was the institutional framework within which Monnet's European work operated for the following five years. Monnet was among those who shaped the European response to Marshall's offer.

David Bruce

US Ambassador to France 1949–52; US Representative to the ECSC 1953–54; US Ambassador to West Germany 1957–59

Bruce was Harriman's son-in-law (having married Ailsa Mellon, daughter of Andrew Mellon) and one of the most well-connected American diplomats in post-war Europe. As Ambassador to France during the critical period of ECSC negotiation, Bruce was an important American interlocutor for Monnet. He subsequently served as the first US Representative to the ECSC — the formal American diplomatic presence at the institution Monnet was running.

John Sherman Cooper

US Senator (Kentucky); various diplomatic assignments

A contact of Monnet's in the broader Atlanticist political network, illustrating the extent to which Monnet cultivated relationships across the American political spectrum rather than limiting himself to a single administration or party.

Felix Frankfurter

Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court 1939–62

Frankfurter was one of the most influential members of the American legal and intellectual establishment in the 1940s and 1950s and a significant figure in the broader Atlantic network. He was acquainted with Monnet through shared Atlantic and New Deal connections.

John Foster Dulles

Secretary of State 1953–59

Dulles and Monnet did not have the same depth of personal relationship that Monnet had with Acheson or Harriman, but they shared the fundamental orientation — West German integration into the Western alliance, European economic union as a stabilising force — that made the ECSC possible. When Dulles became Secretary of State in January 1953, Monnet was six months into his presidency of the ECSC High Authority. The two operated on parallel tracks toward the same strategic objectives.

4.6 The China Connection

From 1933 to 1935, Monnet served as an adviser to the Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek on industrial finance. Working with T.V. Soong (Chiang's brother-in-law and Finance Minister) and the Bank of China, Monnet advised on the financing of railroad development and industrial modernisation projects. This work further expanded his network of American banking contacts — American banks were deeply involved in Chinese development finance — and established a pattern of advisory relationships with governments seeking to modernise their industrial base, a model he would later apply in France.

4.7 WWII: British Supply Council and Washington

In June 1940, following the fall of France, Monnet was appointed a member of the British Supply Council in Washington, charged with coordinating British purchases of American war materiel in the period before US entry into the war. In this capacity he was working directly in Washington alongside the American officials — Harriman, Acheson, Lovett, McCloy — who were managing the Lend-Lease programme and US war production allocation. His wartime Washington service was the period during which his relationships with the American foreign policy establishment were most intensively active.

In 1943, Monnet moved to Algiers to serve as a member of the French Committee of National Liberation, the Free French authority that would become the provisional government of France. He negotiated the supply of American arms to the reconstituted French Army, working with General de Gaulle, General Giraud, and American military and political representatives. His wartime service gave him direct knowledge of, and relationships within, the French military and political leadership that would govern France in the post-war period.

4.8 French Planning Commissioner (1945–1950)

In January 1946, de Gaulle appointed Monnet as France's first Commissaire Général au Plan — the head of a new planning agency charged with designing the post-war modernisation of the French economy. The Monnet Plan (formally, the First French Plan for Modernisation and Equipment, 1947–1952) identified six priority sectors for state-directed investment: coal, steel, electricity, cement, transport, and agricultural machinery.

The planning work created a structural problem that drove the ECSC concept. French steel production targets required access to coking coal from the Ruhr valley in occupied West Germany. France needed German coal but was deeply hostile to any rehabilitation of German heavy industry. Simultaneously, the American Marshall Plan administrators — above all Harriman — were pressing France to accept a degree of German economic recovery as necessary for European stability. Monnet's ECSC proposal addressed both pressures simultaneously.

4.9 The Schuman Plan: Authorship and American Endorsement

The text of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 was drafted by Monnet and a small team of aides, including Étienne Hirsch, Pierre Uri, and Max Kohnstamm. Foreign Minister Robert Schuman lent the declaration his name and delivered it publicly, but the concept, the text, and the strategy were Monnet's.

The negotiating process was conducted in deliberate secrecy — French industry, which opposed the plan, was excluded from prior consultation. Critically, Monnet pre-briefed the American

Secretary of State (Acheson) on 7 May 1950, and US High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt, before the French Cabinet was formally informed on 9 May. Both endorsed the plan immediately. The sequence was not accidental: Monnet sought to present the French government with American endorsement as a *fait accompli*, reducing the political room for opposition.

4.10 ECSC High Authority President (1952–1955)

Monnet served as the first President of the ECSC High Authority from August 1952 to June 1955. He established the institutional culture of the High Authority as technocratic, supranational, and activist. He recruited staff internationally, insisting on their independence from national governments. He levied the ECSC's first production levy — an act of sovereignty by a supranational body with no precedent in international law. The High Authority's Luxembourg headquarters was styled after the design of international institutions rather than national ministries.

During his presidency, Monnet maintained regular communication with his American contacts — Harriman, Acheson (who left office in January 1953 but remained influential), and the new Eisenhower administration officials. He used these relationships to keep American political support for European integration active. John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State from January 1953, was a strong supporter of the ECSC and the broader European integration project.

4.11 The Action Committee and the Treaty of Rome

Monnet resigned the ECSC presidency in June 1955, not because he regarded the ECSC as a failure, but because he believed the integration process needed to be extended to the whole economy. He founded the Action Committee for the United States of Europe — a body composed of the leaders of the major political parties and trade unions of the six ECSC member states, which he used as a lobbying vehicle for further integration.

The Action Committee's advocacy contributed to the negotiations that produced the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Monnet continued as chairman of the Action Committee until 1975. In 1976 he was declared Honorary Citizen of Europe by the European Council — the only person ever to receive this designation. He died on 16 March 1979 at his home in Montfort-l'Amaury.

V. THE REICHSWERKE HERMANN GÖRING (1937–1945)

5.1 Founding and Purpose

On 15 July 1937, a state decree established the Reichswerke Hermann Göring, a government-owned industrial conglomerate created to exploit deposits of low-grade iron ore in the Salzgitter region of Lower Saxony. The Salzgitter deposits had been known for decades but deemed uneconomical by private industry. Hermann Göring, as director of the Four Year Plan, overrode these commercial judgements by decree. The Reichswerke's founding was an act of deliberate confrontation with the existing private industrial order. Thyssen in particular was furious; his subsequent flight to Switzerland in 1939 was partly driven by the Reichswerke's expansion. Initial capitalisation was 5 million Reichsmarks. By 1944, capitalisation had reached 2.3 billion Reichsmarks — the largest enterprise in continental Europe — achieved almost entirely through conquest.

5.2 Expansion by Conquest

Austria — March 1938	Alpine Montan Gesellschaft, Austria's largest integrated steelmaker, was seized and incorporated into the Reichswerke. Based in Linz. Former owners received only token compensation. The Alpine Montan works became the core of the Reichswerke's Austrian operations.
Czechoslovakia 1938–1939 —	Following the Sudetenland occupation (October 1938), the Sudetenland's coal and metalworking industries were seized. Following the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia (March 1939), the Vitkovice steelworks — one of the largest integrated steel producers in continental Europe, partly owned by the Rothschild family — was appropriated. The forced sale realised a fraction of true value. Jewish employees and managers were dispossessed, imprisoned, or killed.
Poland — September 1939	The invasion brought the Silesian coal and steel complex under Reichswerke control. Silesia's coal output was critical to the German war economy. The speed of the Reichswerke's arrival in Poland reflected the degree to which economic exploitation was integrated into military planning.
France — June 1940	The fall of France brought the Reichswerke its most economically significant conquest: the Lorraine iron ore region, representing approximately 40% of French iron ore capacity. The same Lorraine fields that underpinned France's industrial recovery in the post-war period had been feeding the Reichswerke. These fields were subsequently placed under joint Franco-German management within the ECSC.

Yugoslavia — 1941	The Bor copper mines in occupied Yugoslavia were incorporated, providing a significant non-ferrous metals input for the German war economy.
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5.3 The Slave Labour System

At its peak in 1943–44, the Reichswerke employed an estimated 600,000 workers in total, of whom up to 100,000 were slave labourers: prisoners of war (Soviet, French, British, American, Polish, and other Allied soldiers), concentration camp inmates supplied by the SS, and civilians conscripted from occupied territories. Conditions for slave labourers were in many facilities murderous. The Reichswerke leadership was aware of and complicit in the system. Several Reichswerke officials were among those tried at the Nuremberg industrial proceedings.

5.4 Collapse, Allied Seizure, and Industrial Legacy

The Reichswerke's empire dissolved as Allied forces advanced in 1944–45. Eastern assets were lost to Soviet forces; western assets fell to Allied occupation. The future of the Ruhr complex — of which the Reichswerke's German assets formed a major component — became a central question of Allied occupation policy. The International Ruhr Authority, established in April 1949, represented an unsatisfactory compromise. John J. McCloy arrived as High Commissioner in July 1949 to manage this unresolved problem.

The ECSC Treaty of 1951 resolved the Ruhr question by making it irrelevant: the contested coal and steel assets were placed under a supranational authority to which France, Germany, and four other states all belonged. The physical assets the ECSC governed were, in substantial part, the assets that the Reichswerke had built through conquest and operated through slave labour.

VI. THE EUROPEAN COAL & STEEL COMMUNITY (1950–1967)

6.1 The Schuman Declaration

On 9 May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman delivered a declaration proposing to place the entirety of French and German coal and steel production under a common High Authority. The text had been drafted by Monnet. The proposal was negotiated over eleven months in deliberate secrecy among the six founding states. American endorsement — from Acheson and McCloy, both pre-briefed before the French Cabinet — was secured in advance of the public announcement. The date of the declaration, 9 May, is now observed as Europe Day.

6.2 The Treaty of Paris and the Four Institutions

The Treaty of Paris was signed on 18 April 1951 and entered into force on 23 July 1952. It was given a fifty-year lifespan — an unusual provision reflecting uncertainty about the project's longevity — and expired, as scheduled, on 23 July 2002. Founding members: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

High Authority	The supranational executive body. Nine members serving in their personal capacity, independent of national governments. Power to issue binding decisions on firms and states, levy taxes directly on production, and approve or prohibit industrial mergers. The first supranational executive body in world history. Seat: Luxembourg City.
Common Assembly	78 members drawn from national parliaments. Consultative and supervisory role. Could pass a censure motion by two-thirds majority requiring the High Authority's resignation. Met in Strasbourg. Direct predecessor of the European Parliament (directly elected from 1979).
Special Council of Ministers	One minister per member state. Intergovernmental counterweight to the High Authority. Coordinated national policies with ECSC policy. Unanimity required for decisions touching sovereignty. Predecessor of the EU Council.
Court of Justice	Seven judges, six-year terms appointed by common accord. Jurisdiction over disputes between institutions, member states, and firms. Established the precedent of Community law over national law. Became the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

6.3 The High Authority Presidents (1952–1967)

Jean Monnet France, 1952–1955	Architect of the ECSC and its first president. Established the institution's technocratic, supranational character. Levied the first production tax. Resigned June 1955 to found the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, which lobbied for the EEC and Euratom.
René Mayer France, 1955–1958	Former Prime Minister of France (January–June 1953), Radical Party. Finance background. Continued Monnet's policies and oversaw the establishment of the common market in coal and steel as a functioning reality.
Paul Finet Belgium, 1958–1959	Trade union leader, Belgian Socialist Party. First non-French and first labour-movement president of the High Authority. Resigned following a dispute over mining safety regulations in the aftermath of the Marcinelle colliery disaster (1956), in which 262 miners, mostly Italian migrant workers, died.
Piero Malvestiti Italy, 1959–1963	Italian Christian Democrat, former Vice-President of Italy, economics background. Presided over the coal crisis of the early 1960s as cheap imported oil undercut the competitiveness of European coal. Resigned October 1963 on health grounds.
Rinaldo Del Bo Italy, 1963–1967	Italian lawyer and Christian Democrat politician. Presided over the Merger Treaty negotiations. The Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965 unified the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom under a single set of institutions, entering into force 1 July 1967. Del Bo was the last president of the ECSC High Authority in its original form.

6.4 The ECSC as Successor to the Reichswerke Assets

The physical assets over which the ECSC exercised its supranational authority were, in substantial part, those that the Reichswerke had built through conquest. The Lorraine iron ore fields, seized by the Reichswerke in 1940 and now under French sovereignty, were among the key resources pooled. The Ruhr coking coal, which had passed through Allied occupation into the International Ruhr Authority, was the other half of the equation. The ECSC was, in physical terms, a joint management arrangement for the productive core of the former Reichswerke empire.

The human dimension of this continuity was equally direct. McCloy, as High Commissioner, released Alfred Krupp from prison in 1951 after serving three years of a twelve-year Nuremberg sentence for slave labour. Krupp's restored firm became subject to ECSC High Authority oversight. McCloy also reduced the sentences of I.G. Farben board members convicted for slave labour and the production of Zyklon B precursors. Farben's successor companies — BASF, Bayer, and Hoechst — were active within the ECSC member state economies.

VII. THE ATLANTIC ESTABLISHMENT: NETWORK SUMMARY

The following table sets out the principal documented connections between the actors examined in this document.

McCloy ↔ Black Tom	Witnessed the explosion (1916). Spent fifteen years (1924–1939) as lead counsel proving German Imperial government responsibility, acquiring unparalleled knowledge of German institutional structures in the process.
McCloy ↔ von Papen	Black Tom investigation gave McCloy a detailed dossier on von Papen's role in directing US sabotage as Military Attaché in Washington. Von Papen subsequently served as Vice-Chancellor under Hitler and as Nazi Ambassador to Austria and Turkey.
McCloy ↔ Schacht	Contact through Cravath's German reparations practice. Schacht was the principal German counterpart for reparations negotiations and the central figure in Nazi economic policy 1933–37.
McCloy ↔ Monnet	Connected through the Harriman-Acheson circle from wartime onward. As High Commissioner, McCloy was Monnet's essential American partner in Germany during the ECSC negotiations. Co-ordinated directly during the Treaty of Paris process.
McCloy ↔ Krupp/Farben	As High Commissioner, McCloy released Alfred Krupp from Nuremberg imprisonment (1951) and reduced I.G. Farben executives' sentences, restoring management of the industrial firms that became ECSC participants.
Dulles ↔ German industry	Sullivan & Cromwell represented Krupp, I.G. Farben, Thyssen, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, and German sovereign bond issuances throughout the 1920s and into the mid-1930s.
Dulles ↔ Schacht	Regular contact throughout the 1930s on German debt restructuring and the treatment of American creditors holding German industrial paper.
Dulles ↔ Dawes/Young Plans	Sullivan & Cromwell was central to structuring both plans, which directed \$2.5 billion in American private capital to Germany between 1924 and 1931, rebuilding the industrial base subsequently inherited by the Nazi regime.
Monnet ↔ Murnane	Partnership 1934–38. Murnane's position at Brown Brothers Harriman inserted Monnet into the core of the American foreign policy establishment — Harriman, Lovett, and their networks.

Monnet ↔ Harriman	Allied supply work (WWI and WWII), Murnane partnership (1930s), Marshall Plan coordination (1947–50). Harriman as ECA chief pressed European integration as a condition of Marshall Plan assistance. Monnet's ECSC was the institutional answer.
Monnet ↔ Acheson	Personal relationship built over wartime Washington period. Acheson was pre-briefed on the Schuman Plan before the French Cabinet and gave immediate endorsement.
Monnet ↔ McCloy (Germany)	McCloy pre-briefed on Schuman Plan before announcement. As High Commissioner, managed the German dimension of ECSC implementation in coordination with Monnet.
Reichswerke ↔ ECSC	The Ruhr coal and Lorraine iron ore assets seized by the Reichswerke through conquest 1938–40 are the same assets placed under ECSC supranational governance by the Treaty of Paris 1951.
S&C / Cravath ↔ German industry	The twin pillars of American German-corporate law. Both firms had extensive German industrial client bases in the 1920s–30s whose successor companies became ECSC participant firms in the 1950s.

VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

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